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ANTITRUST-BEING A PLAYER AGAINST A MONOPOLY-HOW
PLAINTIFFS CAN PASS GO AND COLLECT $200: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT'S REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSUMER STANDING UNDER
SECTIONS 4 AND 16 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Antitrust laws prevent the monopolization of industries by fostering
competition that results in the protection of consumers' interests.' Without antitrust laws, monopolies would have the effect of eliminating alternative manufacturers or sources of a product, forcing consumers to pay
2
inflated prices or cause consumers to do without a product all together.
3
In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act to "properly control . . . the
great industrial corporation that really has power-the power to arbitrarily
4
control prices and thus exact unjust profits from the people."
The Clayton Act represents a means for private parties to bring antitrust lawsuits and recover damages or obtain an injunction. 5 Private enforcement of antitrust laws is important in helping to ensure that antitrust
1. See At. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990) (stating antitrust laws were enacted to protect competition thereby protecting consumers); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (same); Brown Shoe Co. v.

United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319-20 (1962) (same); Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v.
Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 1997) (agreeing with defendant's contention that "antitrust laws are intended to protect the competitive process"); Vinci v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 80 F.3d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that "antitrust laws are intended to preserve competition for the benefit of consumers in the market ... [and] a plaintiff who is neither a competitor nor a consumer.., does not suffer antitrust injury" (quotations and citations omitted)); see
also Glenn Allen Graft, Note, Target Standing Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act:
When Your Antitrust Injury Hurts, Standing Can Be a Problem, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv 219,
219 (1991) (addressing Congress' intent to keep competition in our free
economy).
2. See Graft, supra note 1, at 221 ("Prior to the enactment of antitrust laws,
huge monopolies had formed and taken control of many markets .... Consumers.., had to pay the excessive prices set by the [monopolies] or do without these

products." (citing E.

KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS

144 (1973))).

3. Pub. L. No. 99435, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1992)). Because the Clayton Act is comprised of Sections 12-27 of Title
15 of the United States Code, 15 U.S.C. § 12 is actually Section 1 of the Clayton
Act.
4. 51 CONG. REc. 9265 (1914) (statement of Rep. Morgan); see also Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261-64 (1972) (discussing probability that congressional intent of antitrust laws was to create free enterprise system).
5. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (establishing right for private action to
recover treble damages); Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (providing injunctive
relief for private litigants); see also Brent W. Huber, Target Corporations,Hostile Horizontal Takeovers and Antitrust Injury Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act After Cargill, 66
IND. L.J. 625, 633 (1991) (discussing various remedies available under Clayton
Act).

(881)
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violations do not go undetected. 6 Textually, the remedial provisions of
the Clayton Act are very broad. 7 However, judicial decisions have restricted the ability of private parties to bring suit.s
Section 4 of the Clayton Act ("Section 4" or "§ 4") grants recovery for
treble damages. 9 Section 16 of the Clayton Act ("Section 16" or "§ 16")
provides for injunctive relief.' 0 The standing requirements for Sections 4
and 16 seem similar on their face; however, federal courts have recognized
differences in the requirements based on the specific remedy each section
provides.' I
This Casebrief explains the Third Circuit's approach to establishing
consumer's antitrust standing under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.
First, Part II discusses the development of antitrust standing under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act in the United States Supreme Court and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 12 Part III explains how a consumer can establish antitrust standing under the current
6. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 745-46 (stating that threat of private action serves
deterrent effect on anti-competitive activities); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & L.
KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
146 (4th ed. 1988) (stating that Congress gave pivate parties standing to sue in order to increase enforcement of antitrust laws); Jill
S. Kingsbury, Note, The Indirect PurchaserDoctrine: Antecedent Transaction?, 65 Mo.
L. REV. 473, 473 (2000) (discussing deterrent effect of § 4 of Clayton Act on anticompetitive activities).
7. For an example of relevant Clayton Act provisions, see infra notes 19, 31
and Graff, supra note 1, at 225.
8. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109 (1986) (requiring special "antitrust injury"); Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983) [hereinafter AGC] (noting additional
standing requirement for antitrust plaintiff beyond Constitutional requirement of
injury in fact); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) (defining type of injury antitrust laws were intended to prevent); Angelico
v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 274 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining scope of
antitrust standing in context of statute); see also Graff, supra note 1, at 220 (citing
Supreme Court precedent as responsible for reducing number of private parties
who can enforce antitrust laws through private action). But see PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND

335a, at 287 (2000) ("The limitations on antitrust standing
are only hinted at by the simple and apparently broad language of § 4 of the Clayton Act.").
9. See Clayton Act § 4 (stating that "any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
thereof ...and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained").
10. See Clayton Act § 16 ("Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall
be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws ....").
11. See Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 21011 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing differences between § 4 and § 16 standing requirements); Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 590-91

THEIR APPLICATION

(3d Cir. 1979) (stating lesser standard applies to § 16 because no risk of duplica-

tive recoveries). For a further discussion of the differences between § 4 and § 16,
see infra notes 31-75 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the development of antitrust, see infra notes 15-75 and
accompanying text.
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13
Third Circuit approach to Section 4 and Section 16 of the Clayton Act.
Finally, Part IV highlights several points in recent Third Circuit cases that
reveal the current Third Circuit standing requirements under Sections 4
14
and 16 of the Clayton Act.

II.

OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST CONSUMER STANDING REQUIREMENTS

15
An"The question of standing is a threshold inquiry in all actions."
titrust standing requirements, however, are distinct from standing requirements as a constitutional doctrine and therefore pose an additional
obstacle for plaintiffs to overcome.16 The Supreme Court has emphasized
that the main purpose of giving private parties remedies for antitrust viola17
tions is not merely to provide relief, but rather, to help enforce the laws.
Consequently, Congress has made bringing an antitrust case very attractive
for private parties, providing the possibility of treble damages, injunctions,
costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees. 18

13. For a discussion of the current antitrust standing approach in the Third
Circuit, see infta notes 76-144 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of recent Third Circuit cases discussing standing requirements, see infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
15. City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 1998);
see also 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices§ 400
(1996) (noting that "the standing inquiry determines whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute").
16. See Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983) ("[T]he focus of the doctrine of 'antitrust standing' is
somewhat different from that of standing as a constitutional doctrine."); City of
Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 264 (describing antitrust standing as balance between encouraging private actions and deterring overly vigorous enforcement); see also Huber, supra note 5, at 634 (noting additional obstacles for plaintiffs to overcome in
antitrust cases); 54 Am. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 401 (1996) (noting additional standing requirements in antitrust cases). For
further discussion of antitrust standing requirements, see infra notes 19-37 and
accompanying text.
17. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31
(1969) (observing main purpose of §§ 4 and 16 of Clayton Act was to enforce antitrust laws), rev'd, 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
18. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1992) (providing damage awards to
private parties); Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1992) (same); see also Ill. Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 755-56 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (cautioning
federal courts "not [to] add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond
what is set forth by Congress in [antitrust] laws" (quoting Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S.
445, 454 (1957))); Jean F. Rydstrom, Standing of Lessor Under Percentage of Profits or
Gross Receipts Lease to Sue for Treble Damages Under § 4 of Clayton Act (15 U.S. C.A. § 15)
for Antitrust Violations Decreasing Profits or Gross Receipts, 27 A.L.R. FED. 866, 876
(1976) (noting that by offering treble damages, Congress encouraged people to
serve as private attorneys general).
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Standing Considerationsfor Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Supreme
Court Precedent

Section 4 of the Clayton Act grants individuals bringing private antitrust actions the right to recover treble damages.' 9 Much of the language
of Section 4 was taken from the language of the Sherman Act. 90 The Sherman Act was Congress' original plan designed to create an "effective remedy for consumers who were forced to pay excessive prices by the giant
2
that dominated certain interstate markets." '
trusts ...
The United States Supreme Court first established an antitrust standing requirement in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat.22 In Brunswick,
the Court established the antitrust-specific standing requirement of "antitrust injury." 2 3 According to Brunswick, "antitrust injury" is an "injury of
the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from
24
that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."
19. See Clayton Act § 4 (providing for treble damages). Section 4 of the Clayton Act states in relevant part:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue thereof in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. Treble damages, consequently, are damages awarded to the plaintiff that are
three times the amount of plaintiffs actual injury as found by the jury. See GILBERT'S LAw SUMMARIES LAW DICTIONARY 337 (1997) (using § 4 of Clayton Act to
provide example of statute awarding treble damages).
20. See AGC, 459 U.S. at 530 (referring to Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 649, § 7,
26 Stat. 210 (1890) (repealed 1955)).,
21. Id.; see also Stasia Mosesso, Note, Up in Smoke: How the Proximate Cause Battle Extinguished the Tobacco War, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 257, 297 (2000) (discussing
history of § 4 of Clayton Act). Most of the Clayton Act is based upon common law
principles because the Sherman Act was created based on such principles. See
AGC, 459 U.S. at 531 (discussing history of Clayton Act (citing 21 CONG. REc. 2456
(1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman)); see also Graff, supra note 1, at 222 (noting
Sherman Act was created to establish tougher antitrust laws).
22. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). In Brunswick, operators of bowling centers brought
an action against the manufacturer of bowling equipment, alleging that the manufacturer's acquisition of bowling centers violated § 7 of the Clayton Act. Brunswick,
429 U.S. at 479-80. As a result of the manufacturer's acquisitions, the plaintiffs
alleged loss of income and decreased competition. Id. at 480. The United States
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove any cognizable damages of
the type that antitrust laws were intended to create and ruled for defendants. See
id. at 490 (dismissing case for lack of cognizable damages).
23. See id. at 489 (holding that plaintiff must prove "antitrust injury" in order
to recover damages). This requirement supplements other antitrust standing requirements that are usually inherent in every case (i.e., the plaintiff must be a
"person" and the plaintiff must have suffered an injury). See William F. Dolan,
Developments in Private Antitrust Enforcement in 1999, 1181 PLI/Cou. 971, 983-85
(2000) (discussing requirements for § 4 standing).
24. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. The Court went on to state that antitrust injury
should, in short, be "the type of loss that the claimed violations ...would be likely
to cause." Id. (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
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The Supreme Court has expressly avoided formulating a black letter
rule for determining standing in antitrust cases. 25 The Court has, however, developed a multi-factor test for establishing standing under Section
4 in the landmark case Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. CaliforniaState
Council of Carpenters ("AGC').26 In AGC, the Court stated its belief that

lower courts should analyze each situation on a fact-specific basis in light
of various factors. 27 The Court held that the satisfaction of numerous factors does not guarantee a plaintiff standing; instead, each factor must be
taken into consideration and weighed according to the facts in each
case.

28

The Supreme Court has made clear that it will not read Section 4 of
the Clayton Act "to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might
125 (1969)). This requirement of "antitrust injury" created a new requirement for
antitrust plaintiffs to meet; no longer was proving causation sufficient. See
Jonathon M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury: Down the
Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273, 284-90 (1998)
(classifying "antitrust injury" as new standing requirement).
Antitrust injury is made up of two parts: (1) harm of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent; and (2) an injury that flows from that which makes the
defendant's act unlawful. See generally Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 485-89 (establishing
two-part antitrust injury test); see also Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 429-30 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing applicability of
Brunswick test in antitrust case).
25. See Mosesso, supra note 21, at 298 (noting Supreme Court's avoidance of
black-letter rule for antitrust standing). The closest the Court has come to formulating a black-letter rule was stating that a plaintiff is not entitled to treble damages
under § 4 simply by showing a violation of the antitrust laws. SeeJ. Truett Payne
Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 563 (1981) (establishing that "automatic damages" do not exist).
26. 459 U.S. 519 (1983). In AGC, a union sued a contractors' association on
antitrust grounds, seeking damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act based on an alleged conspiracy to force builders and contractors to use nonunion subcontractors. AGC, 459 U.S. at 521-23. The Court focused on the standing issue, ultimately
formulating a five-factor test tailored to establish entitlement to sue under antitrust
laws. See id. at 537-40 (discussing factors and elements related to antitrust claim).
The Court held that the union's injury was tenuous and speculative after going
through the five-factor test it established; therefore the Union lacked standing to
sue under § 4 of the Clayton Act. See id. at 545-46 (stating holding).
27. See McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 850 (3d Cir. 1996) (outlining AGC factors applicable in determining standing). The AGC factors are:
(1) [T]he causal connection between the antitrust violation and the
harm to the plaintiff (including whether the defendant intended to cause
that harm; (2) whether the 'nature' of the plaintiff's alleged injury is 'of
the type that the antitrust laws were intended to forestall'; (3) the directness of the asserted injury; (4) the existence of more direct victims of the
alleged injury (i.e. whether the plaintiff is the party most likely to seek
redress of the antitrust violation); and (5) the potential for duplicative
recovery or complex apportionment of damages.
Id. (citations omitted).
28. See AGC, 459 U.S. at 537 (noting that plaintiffs satisfaction of causation
and intent factors are not enough to confer standing).
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conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation." 29 The Court's main purpose behind limiting antitrust standing is to weed out remote and attenuated injuries that would involve massive amounts of evidence and lead to
3°
long and complicated proceedings.
B.

Standing Considerationsfor Section 16 of the Clayton Act: Supreme
Court Precedent

Section 16 of the Clayton Act allows plaintiffs injunctive relief for antitrust violations. 31 Although the language in Section 16 is similar to Sec32
tion 4, differences remain regarding standing requirements.
33

Nevertheless, there are also similarities.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the antitrust injury requirement created in Brunswick applies to all antitrust cases alike, including Sec-

tion 16 claims. 34 In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,3 5 the Court
29. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-63 n.14 (1972); accord Blue
Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) ("Despite the broad wording of § 4
there is a point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.") (citations omitted). Commentators have noted that the limiting of antitrust standing
has had the positive effect of reducing strike suits. SeeJacobson & Greer, supra

note 24, at 274 (noting reduced ability to "extort nuisance settlements").
30. See AGC, 459 U.S. at 544 (stating that complexity implicated by indirect-

ness of injury is concern). While the Court did not allow any "indirect injury"
claims in AGC, it did not specifically rule them out in other situations where there
is not a better equipped party to bring suit. See id. at 542 & n.47 (noting availability
of more interested class of people to bring suit, therefore less justification exists for
remote party to bring suit).
31. See Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1992) (providing injunctive relief to
antitrust claims). Section 16 of the Clayton Act states in relevant part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States havingjurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation
of the antitrust laws. . . and under the same conditions and principles as
injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage
is granted by courts of equity ....

Id.
32. For a discussion of the differences between § 4 and § 16, see infra notes
53-70 and accompanying text.
33. For a discussion of the similarities between § 4 and § 16 see infra notes 3436 and accompanying text.
34. See At. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990)
(stating that requirement of proof of antitrust injury exists in every antitrust case,
even per se violations); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 (1986)
(agreeing with lower court that plaintiff must still allege injury of type antitrust
laws were designed to prevent). But see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (requiring only "threatened injury" to obtain injunction
under § 16 of Clayton Act), rev'd, 401 U.S. 321 (1971); Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Standing of Private Party Under § 16 of Clayton Act (15 U.S. C.A. § 26) to Seek
Injunction to Prevent Merger or Acquisition Allegedly Prohibited Under § 7 of the Act (15
U.S.C.A. § 18), 78 A.L.R. FED. 159, 169, at § 2(a) (1986) (analyzing § 16 of Clayton
Act to require only threatened injury).
35. 479 U.S. 104 (1986). In Cargill,a beef packer brought suit under § 7 of
the Clayton Act, alleging that the proposed merger between two other beef pack-
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established the backbone of Section 16 standing requirements, holding
that Section 16 is similar to Section 4 in requiring prof of "antitrust injury."3 6 The difference between Section 4 and 16 is that Section 16 requires a lesser burden of proof standard-"threatened" antitrust injury,
37
while Section 4 requires an injury to already have occurred.
C.

The Role of Direct PurchaserStatus

The distributor of a product is considered a "direct purchaser" because it is the first entity paying for the product. 38 Frequently, direct purchasers are buying from a monopoly and paying a "monopoly overcharge"
implicit in the price of the product. 3 9 The direct purchaser often absorbs
part of this overcharge and "passes on" part of the overcharge to the "indirect purchaser."40 In the end, consumers are the indirect purchasers,
ers would lead to substantially lessened competition and would possibly create a
monopoly. Cargill,479 U.S. at 106-07. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the merger
between two other beef packer companies under § 16 of the Clayton Act. Id. The
Court held that the plaintiffs showing a threat of loss from increased competition
did not meet the antitrust injury requirement and therefore the Court did not
have to decide whether the proposed merger violated § 7. See id. at 122 (discussing
holding).
36. See id. at 113 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477,
489 (1977)). The Court went on to note, "It would be anomalous ... to read the
Clayton Act to authorize a private plaintiff to secure an injunction against a
threatened injury for which he would not be entitled to compensation if the injury
actually occurred." Id. at 112. The Court in Cargillrelied heavily on its holding in
Brunswick to establish § 16 standing requirements. See id. at 116 (finding that
Brunswick does not require the Court to protect small businesses from loss of profits under § 16 of Clayton Act).
37. See Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 337-38 (rejecting any theory regarding assumption of damages); Cargil 479 U.S. at 111 ("For example, § 4 requires a plaintiff to show actual injury, but § 16 requires a showing only of 'threatened' loss or
damage .... "). It may also be argued, consequently, that § 16 calls for a lesser
showing of damages than § 4 requires. See Heather K_ McShain, Still Alive: Antitrust Injury Remains a Partof the Standing Inquiry Under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act Despite Three Recent Appellate Court Decisions, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 761, 774
(1999) (describing injury requirements of § 16 as less rigorous compared to § 4).
38. See Kingsbury, supra note 6, at 477-78 (discussing direct and indirect purchasers of monopoly products).
39. See id. at 477 (describing "monopoly overcharge" as the "higher-than-competitive price . . . of the monopoly product"); Gregory J. Werden & Marius
Schwartz, Illinois Brick and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations-An Economic Analysis, 35 HAsTINGS L.J. 629, 629 (1984) (describing how price fixing arrangement
violates Sherman Act and affects purchasers).
40. See Kingsbury, supranote 6, at 477-78 (discussing theory of "passing-on").
The "indirect purchaser" is the next link in the vertical supply chain, usually another distributor; this shows how passing-on may occur several times before reaching the final consumer. See id. (discussing indirect purchasers and theory of
passing-on within vertical supply chain). Many distributors attempt to use "passing-on" as a defense to charging inflated prices in order to compensate for the
monopoly overcharge they paid to the distributor above them in the vertical supply
chain. See id. (discussing concept of defensive passing-on). The Supreme Court,
however, has rejected this defense, stating that an injury is complete upon charg-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46: p. 881

forced to pay inflated prices for products due to this monopoly overcharge. 4 1 Because the monopoly overcharge is divided unequally
throughout the passing-on process, uncertainty arises regarding which
party may recover under Section 4.42
The Supreme Court addressed this concept of "passing-on" in the
context of a price-fixing conspiracy in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.4 3 The
Court held that the passing-on theory does not allow indirect purchasers
to pursue claims against firms engaged in price fixing. 44 This ruling has
been the subject of debate as to whether it stands for all indirect purchaser
claims, or just price-fixing situations. 45 In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court and lower courts have indicated that an absolute bar on indi46
rect purchaser recovery is not what Congress intended.
The Supreme Court noted in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,47 that

although indirect purchaser status may seriously hamper any recovery

ing an illegally high price. See Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S.
481, 489 (1968) (rejecting "passing-on" defense).
41. See Kingsbury, supra note 6, at 478 (noting consumers bear much of overcharge effect in form of higher prices).
42. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 492-93 (stating that apportionment of damages among various direct and indirect purchasers would be too complicated). But
cf John Cirace, ApportioningDamages Between Direct and Indirect Purchasersin Consolidated Antitrust Suits: ARC America Unravels the Illinois Brick Rule, 35 VILL. L. REv.
283, 311-16 (1990) (discussing how it is theoretically possible to calculate monopoly overcharge passed on from purchaser to purchaser).
43. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In Illinois Brick, the state of Illinois and local government entities alleged damages under § 4 against concrete block manufacturers
who were allegedly taking part in a price-fixing conspiracy. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S.
at 726-27. The plaintiffs purchased the defendant's product indirectly through
contractors, yet alleged they had suffered injuries under the passing-on theory. Id.
at 726. The Court held that the pass-on theory may not be used by plaintiffs to
establish injury under § 4 due to the difficulty in ascertaining the exact amount of
injury absorbed by any single purchaser. See id. at 746-47 (describing rationale for
decision).
44. See id. at 735 (declining to construe § 4 to allow pass-on theory in certain
circumstances). The Court's rationale primarily rested on three reasons: (1) difficulty in calculating the exact amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) deterrence, rather than compensation was the primary purpose of antitrust damages
and (3) precedent called for the rejection of the passing-on theory. See Roger D.
Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern Antitrust
Standing Analysis, 68 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1999) (discussing rationale of Illinois Brick decision).
45. See Blair & Harrison, supra note 44, at 38-42 (discussing various interpretations of Illinois Brick holding).
46. See id. at 42 (stating that Illinois Brick decision is obsolete). For further
discussion on the relevance of indirect purchaser status, see infra notes 47-52 and
accompanying text.
47. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
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under Section 4,48 it is not an absolute bar. 49 Indirect purchaser plaintiffs, however, may be denied the right to recover in favor of a direct purchaser higher up the distribution chain. 50 The McCready Court discussed
this concept as one requiring proximate cause analysis. 5 1 The Court
stated the main factors for evaluating proximate cause are:
(1) ...the physical and economic nexus between the alleged
violation and the harm to the plaintiff, and (2) more particularly,
to the relationship of the injury alleged with those forms of injury
about which Congress was likely to have been concerned in making defendant's conduct unlawful and in providing a private remedy under § 4.52
D.

The Circuits' Interpretation of Supreme Court Precedent

Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Cargill, many lower courts
have emphasized that the standing requirements under Section 16 are less
stringent than cases under Section 4.53 Remoteness issues are less relevant
in Section 16 cases because of the lack of concern about multiple lawsuits,
48. See id. at 474; see also Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 744 (holding indirect purchaser status bars plaintiffs § 4 recovery). The Illinois Brick decision was primarily
made on the possibility of duplicative recovery from awarding damages to various
direct and indirect purchasers. See id. (noting reasons for holding). This rationale, consequently, has been followed more recently. See, e.g., Kansas v. UtiliCorp
United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 206-19 (1990) (refusing to allow indirect purchaser any
recovery despite incurring one hundred percent of the monopoly overcharge).
49. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 476 (noting that plaintiffs not barred from bringing suit under Section 4 if they are "necessary and foreseeable" victim of alleged
antitrust violation). But see UtiliCorp United, 497 U.S. at 219 (refusing to carve out
exception to direct purchaser requirement for situations where on one hundred
percent of overcharge is passed-on to plaintiff). In McCready, a group health care
subscriber brought suit against the health insurer and an organization of Virginia
psychiatrists seeking treble damages under section 4. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 46770. The plaintiff alleged that the insurer's failure to reimburse her for psychologist therapy, while the insurer allowed reimbursement for similar therapy by psychiatrists, was a conspiracy to restrain competition in the psychotherapy market.
See id. The Court allowed recovery under section 4 despite indirect purchaser status because the injury suffered by plaintiff was "inextricably intertwined" with the
injury defendant's sought to inflict. See id. at 484.
50. See 3 EARL W. KITNER &JoSEPH P. BAUR, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw § 78.1, at
3-4 (1998) (discussing plaintiff standing requirements for antitrust claim).
51. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 477-78 (noting proximate cause's significance on
antitrust standing requirements).
52. Id. at 478.
53. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 856 (3d Cir. 1996)
(recognizing § 16 standing requirements more expansive than.§ 4 requirements);
Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir.

1980) (recognizing that "'[s]ection 16 has been applied more expansively, both
because its language is less restrictive than that of § 4 ...and because the injunctive remedy is a more flexible and adaptable tool"' (quoting Bogus v. Am. Speech &
Hearing Assoc., 585 F.2d 277, 288-89 (3d Cir. 1978))).
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duplicative recovery and complex apportionment of damages.5 4 Lower
courts continue to recognize that "antitrust standing inquiry is not a blackletter rule, but rather, is 'essentially a balancing test comprised of many
constant and variable factors .... ,,,55
1.

Third Circuit Histoiy

A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation,56 best illustrates the circuit's approach to distinguishing between Section 4 and Section 16 standing requirements. 57 In Warfarin, the Third Circuit recognized the
Supreme Court's ruling in Cargill as controlling law, noting that "relief
sought pursuant to section 4 of the Clayton Act requires proof of loss...
'5 8
[where] injunctive relief under section 16 only requires a threat of loss."

The court was careful to note that antitrust plaintiffs under Section 16
must still prove antitrust injury stemming from the Brunswick holding"injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent .... ,,59 The
54. SeeCargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n.6 (1986) (noting that

"'one injunction is effective as 100"' (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S.
251, 261 (1972))). "Although the requirement [in Section 16 claims] is reduced,
plaintiffs whose injuries are too indirect and derivative remain unable to sue even
for injunctive relief." Jacobson & Greer, supra note 24, at 290 (citing AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, 1 346a, 364c, 378).
55. City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir.
1998) (quoting Merican, Inc. v. CaterpillarTractorCo., 713 F.2d 958, 964-65 (3d Cir.
1983)); see also

HERBERT HOVENKAMP,

COMPETITION AND

ITS PRACTICE

FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:

THF LAW OF

543 (1994) ("[u]nfortunately, the courts have

never been able to create an intelligible theory of private antitrust standing ...
[and thus,] [t]he law remains haphazard and inconsistent."); McShain, supra note
37, at 775 (noting difficulty in applying and interpreting antitrust standing
requirements).
56. 214 F.3d 395 (3d Cir. 2000).
57. See id. at 399 (discussing how recovery under § 16 of Clayton Act differs
from recovery under § 4 of Act). In Warfarin, consumers of a prescription bloodthinning drug brought antitrust class action against the drug's manufacturer, alleging the defendant manufacturer interfered with approval and acceptance of a
competitor's generic equivalent of the drug. See id. at 396-97. Circuit Judge
Mansmann, writing for the Third Circuit, held the plaintiff class was a foreseeable
victim, with an injury "inextricably intertwined" to defendant's action and there
was no risk of duplicative recovery, therefore standing under § 16 was met. See id.
at 400-01 (relying on McCready). Consequently, Judge Mansmann also noted that
the plaintiff class fit the stereotypical "indirect purchaser mold," which precluded
recovery under Section 4. See id. at 399.
58. Id. at 399 (citing Cargil, 479 U.S. at 109-11); accord City of Pitt., 147 F.3d at
268 (noting that Section 16 only differs from Section 4 standing because only
threat of injury must be proven under section 16); Mid-West Paper Prod. Co. v.
Cont'l Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 591 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that plaintiffs under
§ 16 must only demonstrate threat of injury).
59. Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 399 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
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Third Circuit has also emphasized that the AGC factors should continue to
be used in establishing standing under Section 4.60
Although Section 16 requires only threatof loss, the Third Circuit has
taken this requirement seriously. In City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power
Co., 61 the Third Circuit precluded the plaintiff from establishing standing
62
Alunder Section 16 based on the threat of loss being too speculative.
though a threatened loss existed in City of Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit indi63
cated that the lack of the causation element was decisive.
Similarly, in Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Mor-is, Inc. 64 ("Steamfitters"), the Third Circuit reaffirmed its position that
proximate cause analysis plays a crucial role in antitrust standing analysis. 65 In Steamfitters, the Third Circuit stated its position that "while there
may be a causal connection between the conduct of defendants and the
injuries alleged by the plaintiffs," the injuries must be connected to conduct of the defendants that violates the antitrust laws. 66 This position,
60. See id. (stating that standing under § 4 is determined by number of factors
(citing Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,459 U.S. 519,
538 (1983))); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 171
F.3d 912, 925-30 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying AGC factors to determine standing in
section 4 claim), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1105 (2000).
61. 147 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 1998).
62. See id. at 269 (noting plaintiffs failed to establish causal connection). In
City of Pittsburgh, the city hoped to revitalize several urban areas by transforming
them into commercial and residential areas ("Redevelopment Zones"). See id. at
259-60. At the time of the proposed development only two utility companies were
authorized to provide service to the county, and only one was authorized to provide service in the Redevelopment Zones. See id. A Pennsylvania law, however,
provided natural monopolies to the utility companies, only allowing a new provider if existing service was inadequate. See id. Soon after the Redevelopment plan
was announced, the two utility companies authorized to provide service to the
county announced their intention to merge; this gave rise to the complaint which
alleged probable rate increases based on the non-competitive environment. See id.
The Third Circuit held that the city lacked standing under Sections 4 and 16 because the proposed merger did not lessen competition-because of a regulatory
quirk, only one utility company could provide service regardless of the number of
companies. See id. at 269.
63. See id. at 268 (denying plaintiff standing because of absence of causal connection between alleged injury and antitrust violation).
64. 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999).
65. See id. at 922-32 (discussing antitrust standing issues of remoteness and
proximate cause being able to prevent plaintiff to enjoin or remedy violation). In
Steamfitters, union health and welfare funds brought suit against tobacco companies to recover the funds' costs of treating their participants with smoking-related
illnesses. See id. at 918-19. The plaintiffs claimed that the tobacco companies, by
allegedly preventing fund members from obtaining information about safer smoking-related products, defrauded them. See id. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's claim because of the remoteness of
plaintiffs injury. See id. at 918.
66. See id. at 926 (stating court's uncertainty whether plaintiffs claim is of
type antitrust laws are intended to remedy). The Steamfitters court went on to note
some situations that probably would not satisfy the causal connection requirement:
a business's decision not to produce a product, all of the businesses in an industry
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consequently, was derived from Supreme Court precedent requiring proximate cause analysis in antitrust claims. 67 Despite the Supreme Court's
emphasis on proximate cause analysis, it has yet to formulate a decisive
68
rule for the circuits to follow.
The Third Circuit has at times alluded to an additional requirement
in Section 4 cases. This requirement only allows standing to plaintiffs that
prove to be the "most efficient enforcer" of the antitrust laws. 69 In condeciding to keep a new product from reaching consumers or a business's decision
to delay introduction of a product. See id. at 925-26 n.7 (noting as general rule,

businesses may bring their product to market whenever they choose).
67. See id. at 921 (noting that if injury is too remote to satisfy common law
concept of proximate cause, claim will lack antitrust standing requirement (citing
Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982))). The Court in McCready stated
that "[ilt is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allows every

person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or property." Blue Shield v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982). The Third Circuit went on to note that by

the Supreme Court requiring plaintiffs to prove proximate cause to achieve antitrust standing, a plaintiff may prove an antitrust violation, yet still lack standing.
See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 921 (noting that plaintiffs with remote injuries will lack
antitrust standing). The Third Circuit also noted that the while causal connection
is an important factor to consider, it is not conclusive to establish standing. See id.
at 922 (citing McCready, 457 U.S. at 477 n.13; Assoc. Gen. Contractors,Inc. v. Cal. State
Council of Carpenters,459 U.S. 519, 536-37 & n.34 (1983); Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 964 (3d Cir. 1983)).
68. See Assoc. Gen. Contractors,Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 536-37 (stating that it is "virtually impossible" to establish black-letter rule
applicable in every case); McCready, 457 U.S. at 477 n.13 (noting that principle of
proximate cause is hardly an analytic tool therefore legislative intent is controlling); Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 964 (3d Cir. 1983)
(rationalizing that reason Supreme-Court has not adopted black-letter rule is because of variety of claims arising under antitrust statutes).
69. See Huhta v. Children's Hosp., No. CIV.A.93-2765, 1994 WL 245454, at *1
(E.D. Pa. May 31, 1994) (requiring plaintiff to prove "most efficient enforcer" to
gain standing); see also In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d
1144, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (focusing on whether plaintiffs were persons antitrust
laws were enacted to protect). In Huhta, the plaintiff, a former staff member in a
hospital, alleged the hospital and fellow staff members denied him the right to
officially interpret diagnostic procedures, thereby depriving him of approximately
$200,000 in revenue. See Huhta, 1994 WL 245454, at *1. Plaintiff argues that he
alone was the sole individual to suffer harm. See id. at *2. The court, however,
agreed with the defendants that the direct victims of the alleged violations were
the patients and insurance providers who were consumers of the services. See id.
Because the plaintiff was not the "most efficient enforcer," he was barred from
bringing suit. See id. For further discussion of Huhta and its role in the most efficient enforcer requirement, see Jacobson & Greer, supra note 24, at 401-02 n.14753.
Other circuits have similarly held the "most efficient enforcer" to be an independent requirement. See Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1449
(11th Cir. 1991) (requiring most efficient enforcer of violation to bring claim);
Leak v. Grant Med. Ctr., 893 F. Supp. 757, 764 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (noting plaintiffs
were not efficient enforcers and lacked standing); Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 999 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (listing efficient enforcer factors
and concluding that plaintiff lacked standing).
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trast, the Third Circuit has been lenient in allowing Section 16 standingrecognizing that indirect purchasers may bring suit under Section 16 even
70
when no right to Section 4 damages exists.
2.

Other Circuits' Application of Supreme Court Precedent

The Eighth Circuit has recently formulated a new rule for plaintiff
standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.7 ' Under this rule, consumers who bear a portion of a monopoly overcharge, due to a previous transaction between the monopolist and another purchaser, are barred from
collecting damages under Section 4; however, plaintiffs may still be entitled to an injunction pursuant to Section 16.72
Many states have adopted statutes granting indirect purchasers standing for recovery purposes.7 3 However, the circuits generally have followed
the Supreme Court's guidelines set forth in AGC and Cargillto determine
what satisfies antitrust standing.74 Despite the Supreme Court precedent,
70. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 399 (3d Cir.
2000) (stating that "[i]ndirect purchaser status, however, is not fatal to a plaintiffs
request for injunctive relief under section 16"); McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc.,
80 F.3d 842, 856-57 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiff standing under Section 16 of
Clayton Act, however no standing under Section 4 of Act).
71. See Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1171-74 (8th Cir. 1998)
(developing new Section 4 standing requirement). In Campos, a group of plaintiffs
were concert ticket purchasers. See id. at 1168. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, a ticket distributor for large scale concert events, entered into exclusive
contracts with concert venues and charged a "handling fee" that violated antitrust
laws by monopolizing the market on ticket distribution. See id. at 1168. As a result
of paying this fee, plaintiffs sought treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act and an injunction under Section 16 of the Act. See id. at 1169. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. held that plaintiffs were indirect
purchasers of the tickets and therefore were precluded from recovery under Illinois
Brick. See id. at 1171-72. But see Kingsbury, supra note 6, at 476-77, 492 (criticizing
Campos opinion).
72. See Campos, 140 F.3d at 1171-72 (denying plaintiffs standing because of
"indirect purchaser" status).
73. See Kingsbury, supra note 6, at 484 n.98 (providing examples of statutes
allowing indirect purchasers standing to recover).
74. See, e.g., Am. Ad Mgmt. v. Gen. Tel. Co., 190 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 (9th Cir.
1999) (applying various AGC factors to determine standing without creating new
factors); Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc. 173 F.3d 995, 1021 (6th Cir. 1999)
(applying AGC factors to defeat defendants standing defense); Steamfitters Local
Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 925-31 (3d Cir.
1999) (analyzing AGC factors to determine if plaintiff had standing), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1105 (2000); Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting
right to sue under Section 4 has been judicially limited by "antitrust standing"
doctrine of AGC); Nelson v. Monroe Reg'l Med. Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555, 1562 (7th Cir.
1991) (stating Supreme Court was unwilling to create bright line standing rule and
developed AGC factors instead); Todorov, 921 F.2d, at 1448 (reiterating common
law tort limitations placed on Section 4 and its predecessor); South Dakota v. Kan.
City S. Indus., Inc., 880 F.2d 40, 45-46 (8th Cir. 1989) (limiting standing factors);
Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing
requirements for proper plaintiff); see also Lucas Auto. Eng'g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/
Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Cargill as controlling
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most circuit courts have difficulty distinguishing between the concepts of
75
antitrust injury and antitrust standing.

III.

ANALYSIS: WHAT IT TAKES TO ACHIEVE STANDING IN THE
THIRD CIRCUIT

Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act are remedial statutes that have
the effect of providing additional standing requirements on antitrust
plaintiffs. 76 Supreme Court precedent, however, has consistently stated
that the main objective of antitrust laws is to protect consumers. 77 In order for consumers to gain standing under the Clayton Act, the Third Cir78
cuit has focused on evaluating the criteria established in AGC: (1)

authority for determining standing under Clayton Act); Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol
Med. Prod., Inc., 976 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. W.
Elec. Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 1231, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (same); Reazin v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, Inc. 899 F.2d 951, 960-62 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Fischer v. NWA,
Inc., 883 F.2d 594, 599-600 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); Consol. Gold Fields PLC v.
Minoroco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 257 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); Axis, S.P.A. v. Micafil,
Inc., 870 F.2d 1105, 1108 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); Ind. Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu
Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1417 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
75. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 265 n.15
(3d Cir. 1998) (noting that "there is no bright line distinction between" antitrust
injury and antitrust standing); Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil
Corp., 998 F.2d 391, 394-95 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that antitrust injury and standing are necessary under Section 4); Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc., 753
F.2d 242, 247 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting antitrust injury and standing are usually confused and adopting AGC factors for standing); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 8, 360e (same).
76. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986) (holding that
lack of standing under Section 16 of Clayton Act therefore no reason to rule on
substantive claim).
77. See Ad. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990)
(stating that "antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors" (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))); see also
Harry G. Holz, The Robinson-PatmanAct: Standing and Antitrust Injury, The Defenses,
Discriminationin PromotionalAllowances and Services, The Brokerage Provision, 777 PLI/
CoRP. 289, 299 (1992) (noting that after Supreme Court's most recent decision,
consumers seem to be better suited to bring suit than competitors).
78. See, e.g., Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 925-30 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying AGC factors to determine plaintiffs standing), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1105 (2000); City of
Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 264 (same); Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 1997) (same).
Antitrust standing, consequently, must be proven in addition to constitutional
standing. See Sanner v. Chi. Bd. of Trade, 62 F.3d 918, 922-27 (7th Cir. 1995)
(requiring proof of standing in constitutional sense as well as antitrust). Full discussion of constitutional standing is beyond the scope of this Casebrief and therefore will not be discussed.
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causation of injury by defendant's conduct;7 9 (2) directness of injury; 80

(3) the existence of more direct victims of the alleged antitrust violations; 8' (4) the potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages; 82 and (5) antitrust injury.8 3 At times, however, the
Third Circuit has strayed from interpreting AGC so narrowly, opting to
apply its own "more succinct" test that evaluates: "(1) harm of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent; and (2) an injury to the plaintiff
which flows from that which makes defendant's acts unlawful." 84 Both of
these tests, consequently, take the same factors into consideration85
namely, the AGC factors.

79. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 265-69 (deciding case based on causation
issue); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, 360b (stating despite Section
16 requiring only threatened injury, there is no reduction in causation element).
Causation in this context presupposes that the plaintiff can show that they suffered
actual injury; that injury must be due to defendant's conduct that was the material
cause of the injury. See Holz, supra note 77, at 294 (discussing elements of antitrust
standing).
80. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 922-32 (noting remoteness issue in context of
proximate cause). Directness of injury mainly proposes that the injury cannot be
attenuated or remote. See Holz, supranote 77, at 294 (defining directness of injury
in terms of nexus to defendant's illegal act).
In McCready,Justice Brennan described the relevant characteristics to evaluate
in remoteness issues, "(1) ... the physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation and the harm to the plaintiff, and (2), more particularly, to the
relationship of the injury alleged with those forms of injury about which Congress
was likely to have been concerned in making defendant's conduct unlawful ...
Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478 (1982).
81. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 927 (stating interest of more identifiable class
of persons would preclude finding of standing of more remote party (quoting Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542
(1983))).
82. See id. at 928-29 (noting that plaintiff's claims may be easily calculated via
statistical models); McCarthy v. Recordex Serv. Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 851-52 (3d Cir.
1996) (noting that apportionment of damages problem may preclude recovery).
83. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986) (requiring
plaintiff to prove antitrust injury in order to recover under Section 16 of Clayton
Act); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (requiring proof of antitrust injury in order for plaintiff to recover damages under
Section 4 of Clayton Act). Each of the five requirements listed in text accompanying notes 79-83 involve different legal and policy arguments, therefore, the ab-

sence of any requirement in a given case may preclude recovery. See City of
Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 264-65 (concluding that balance must be struck analyzing
numerous factors because no black-letter rule exists).
84. Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 924-25 n.6 (citing Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 429 (3d Cir. 1993)). This two-part test is derived from the Supreme Court's ruling in Brunswick. See Gulfstream III, 995 F.2d at
429 (stating that Brunswick set forth two-part test to determine antitrust standing).
85. See, e.g., Gulfstream III, 995 F.2d at 429-30 (applying two-part test to establish standing yet using AGC factors of proximate cause and directness of injury to
satisfy test).
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Under the Clayton Act, pleading the correct type of injury can make
or break a case. 86 Although a plaintiff may not have standing to pursue a

claim under Section 4, that same plaintiff may be entitled to an injunction
under Section 16.87 The Supreme Court has agreed, noting that Sections
4 and 16 are not all that different, referring to the two sections as
"complementary." 88
The following analysis dissects the Third Circuit requirements for antitrust standing under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. The Third
Circuit has interpreted Supreme Court precedent as a narrowing view on
an otherwise broad remedial statute. 8 9 Consumers, rather than competitors, seem to be favored under the Third Circuit approach; this preference, however, is not dispositive. 90 Antitrust standing within the Third
Circuit, nevertheless, remains an area requiring scrupulous detail. 9 1 The
Third Circuit has held that no black-letter rule exists for antitrust standing. 92 Consequently, this finding favors potential antitrust plaintiffs by allowing some wiggle room.
86. See Blair & Harrison, supra note 44, at 42 (noting that standing can turn
on way plaintiff frames complaint); Mosesso, supra note 21, at 299 (stating that
"pleading the correct type of injury is central to recovery").
87. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 110-11 (distinguishing standing requirements of

Section 4 compared to Section 16, concluding that plaintiffs lack standing under
Section 16, despite Section 16's less stringent standing requirements); accord In re
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2000) (granting
Section 16 standing but not Section 4 standing because only "threat" of loss could
be proven); McCarthy, 80 F.3d at 856 (noting Section 16 standing has applies more
expansively than Section 4 based on less threat of duplicative recovery);
Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210-11 (3d Cir.
1980) (distinguishing standing analysis of Section 16 from Section 4 because Section 16 requires lower threshold based on statute's language and less risk of duplicative recovery); Huber, supra note 5, at 638 & n.88-91 (stating how standing
analysis under Section 16 is more plaintiff friendly than Section 4 because no
threat of duplicative recovery with Section 16); Tefft W. Smith & Hillard M. Sterling, Challenging Competitors' Mergers: A Real Strategic Option, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 57,
63 (1996) (determining standing analysis differences depending on relief sought).
88. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 113 ("Sections 4 and 16 are thus best understood as
providing complementary remedies for a single set of injuries.").
89. See City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir.
1998) (interpreting AGCas requiring narrow view on antitrust standing); Barton &
Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that Supreme Court precedent requires narrow reading of antitrust standing
(citing Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
529-33 (1983))).

90. See City of Pittsburgh,147 F.3d at 266 (noting that city's status as consumer
is factor but not dispositive).

91. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 399 (stating that antitrust standing must be analyzed based on number of factors, then proceeding to analyze factors); City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 264 (noting particular significance of antitrust standing

requirements).
92. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 264-65 (stating that antitrust standing inquiry is balancing test not black letter law).
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A.

Applying the Indirect PurchaserConcept

The following hypothetical provides an example of when a consumer
may have standing to recover under Section 4 and when he or she may
not.93 Assume that a consumer named Bob wants to get an oil change on
his car. Assume that the oil manufacturer is the monopolist. Also assume
that Bob has two options: (1) he can buy the oil directly from the manufacturer, and perform the oil change himself, or (2) he can hire the services of a mechanic to perform the oil change.
If Bob opts to have the mechanic do the oil change, Bob would be a
direct purchaser of mechanic services and an indirect purchaser of oil, the
monopoly product. In this situation, Bob would bear the monopoly overcharge passed on by the mechanic. 94 Under this hypothetical, Bob may be
precluded from recovery under Section 4 due to the problems of multiple
liability and apportionment of damages. 9 5 Despite Bob's indirect purchaser status, Bob may still be successful seeking an injunction under Section 16.96
1.

Indirect PurchaserInfluence in the Third Circuit

The Third Circuit may prevent indirect purchaser standing under
Section 4 if the injury claimed is too attenuated from the alleged violation. 97 The Third Circuit has inferred that it may require a plaintiff's injury to be "inextricably intertwined" with the injury the defendant sought
93. The hypothetical used in this Casebrief is based in part on a hypothetical
by Jill S. Kingsbury. See Kingsbury, supra note 6, at 488-90 (applying indirect purchaser doctrine). Kingsbury's hypothetical focuses on a specific distinction between the hypothetical presented and an Eighth Circuit case. See id. (showing
consequences of Eighth Circuit antitrust precedent).
94. For an explanation of the concepts of "direct purchasers," "indirect purchasers" and "monopoly overcharge," see supra notes 38-52 and accompanying
text.
95. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 744-45 (1977) (discussing
problems associated with indirect purchaser status); accord McCarthy v. Recordex
Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating problems of apportioning
damages present in Illinois Brick also in present case thereby precluding recovery).
But see In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1169 (3d Cir.
1993) (stating that complex apportionment of damages, by itself, should not preclude recovery).
96. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 401-02 (granting Section 16 standing but not
Section 4 standing because only "threat" of loss could be proven); McCarthy, 80
F.3d at 856 (noting Section 16 standing applies "more expansively" than Section
4); Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210-11 (3d
Cir. 1980) (allowing Section 16 injunction but not Section 4 damages because Section 16 requires lower standing threshold based on statute's language and less risk
of duplicative recovery).
97. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400 (discussing Section 4 standing requirements
in relation to indirect purchaser doctrine (citing Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457
U.S. 465, 476-78 (1982))). The Court in McCready stated that remoteness of the
plaintiff's injury plays a serious role in determining standing under Section 4. See
McCready, 457 U.S. at 476-78. The Court went on to note that the alleged violation
should also be the type of injury Congress intended prevent. See id.
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to inflict in order for a plaintiff to recover under Section 4.98 Indirect
purchasers in the Third Circuit may also have to prove an additional requirement to be eligible for recovery under Section 4-the absence of
duplicative recovery. 99
Although the indirect purchaser label may preclude recovery under
Section 4, it is not determinative under Section 16.100 The Third Circuit
has consistently followed the Supreme Court's lead in determining which
factors should be considered in allowing injunctive relief under Section 16
instead of treble damages under Section 4.101
B.
1.

Third CircuitApplication of the AGC Standing Requirements for Section 4
Being Mr. or Mrs. Right

A plaintiff may be barred from recovery under Section 4 if he or she is
not the proper party bringing suit. The Third Circuit has inferred that a
plaintiff must be a "foreseeable and necessary victim" of the antitrust violation to survive the remoteness issue. 10 2 This does not require a plaintiff to
be a direct purchaser; rather, the plaintiff must be the ultimate target of
1 13
the monopolistic conspiracy.
The Third Circuit's approach to indirect purchaser status frustrating Section 4
standing but not Section 16 standing may be summarized as follows:
[I]n contrast to the treble damage action, a claim for injunctive relief
does not present the countervailing considerations-such as the risk of
duplicative or ruinous recoveries and the spectre of a trial burdened with
complex and conjectural economic analyses-that the Supreme Court
emphasized when limiting the availability of treble damages.
Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400 (quoting Mid-West PaperProds. Co. v. Cont'l Group, Inc.,
596 F.2d 573, 590 (3d Cir. 1979)).
98. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400-01 (discussing implications of injury being
"inextricably intertwined" with defendant's conduct (quoting McCready, 457 U.S. at
484)).
99. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400 (noting recovery under Section 4 allowed
when there is absence of duplicative recovery (citing McCready, 457 U.S. at 484)).
It should be noted that Warfarindid not decide the issue of damages under Section
4 because the plaintiffs only sought Section 16 injunctive relief. See id (stating "the
class only seeks Section 16 injunctive relief").
100. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 399 (stating that indirect purchaser status "is not
fatal" to Section 16 claim); Schoenkopf 637 F.2d at 210 (noting Section 16 relief less
restrictive than Section 4); Mid-West Paper,596 F.2d at 594 (holding plaintiffs do
not have to satisfy direct purchaser requirement as condition for Section 16
recovery).
101. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400 (noting that claim for injunctive relief does
not present risk of duplicative recoveries or trial burdened with complex economic
analyses (quoting Mid-West Paper, 596 F.2d at 590)).
102. See id. at 400 (noting plaintiffs not barred under Section 4 when they are
foreseeable and necessary victims (citing McCready, 457 U.S. at 484)).
103. See id. at 401 (describing "inextricably intertwined" factor). The court in
Warfarin summarized its rationale, "Regardless of the existence of the various links
of middlemen, if there were no ultimate consumer of [the drug], prices charged
for the drug ... would be irrelevant." Id.
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Careful Calculation of Injury: The Direct Injury & Proximate Cause
Factors

A plaintiff may be barred from recovery under Section 4 if the injury
suffered is too remote from the alleged violation.10 4 More specifically, the
Third Circuit may deny a claim if a more directly injured class of persons
capable of bringing suit exists. 10 5 This requirement, often referred to as
"directness of injury," is independent from "antitrust injury" under the
AGC framework.' 0 6 Third Circuit precedent states that a consumer "cannot obtain damages without showing that he actually paid more than he
10 7
would have paid in the absence of the violation."
To fully satisfy the "directness of injury" requirement, the plaintiff
must prove that the injury suffered is "inextricably intertwined" with the
injury the defendant sought to inflict.10 8 This factor seems to be linked to
another AGC factor-calculating apportionment of damages. The Third
Circuit has denied standing when damages are "speculative"-meaning
that they would be difficult to calculate. 10 9 A consumer plaintiff should
establish a direct link between the purported antitrust violations and the

harm alleged, noting the exact apportionment of damages.

10

104. See id. at 400 (citing McCready, 457 U.S. at 476-78); Steamfitters Local
Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 921 (3d Cir.
1999) (stating that "key problem with plaintiffs' complaint is remoteness of their
alleged injury"), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1105 (2000); City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn
Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 269 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that due to lack of causal
connection, plaintiff's claim was without merit).
105. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 927 ("'The existence of an identifiable class of
persons ... diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party ... to
perform the office of a private attorney general."' (quoting Assoc. Gen. Contractors,
Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983))).
106. Comparesupra note 24 and accompanying text (defining antitrust injury)
with infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (describing directness of injury
factor).

107. City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 269 (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 8, 370).
108. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400 (citing McCready, 457 U.S. at 484). In Warfarin, the Third Circuit decided that the high price that consumers were forced to
pay for a prescription drug was the type of loss the alleged violation would likely
cause; therefore, the injury was not remote. See id. More specifically, to prove
antitrust injury, the Third Circuit cites Brunswick as controlling law. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 265 (citing Brunswick to define "antitrust injury"). The Court in
Brunswick stated:
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
109. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 268-69 (determining there was no way to
properly calculate plaintiff's alleged damages).
110. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 930-31 (stating that extremely difficult and
complex nature of damages outweighs satisfaction of other AGC factors); City of
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Establishing directness of injury and ease in calculating damages,
however, is not conclusive for establishing antitrust standing; they are
merely two factors to be considered.' 11 Remoteness of injury may also
have an impact on proximate cause analysis. 1" 2 In Steamfitters, for example, the Third Circuit used the remoteness of the plaintiffs' injuries to
preclude the finding of proximate cause. 13 The Third Circuit stated that
the forseeability of the plaintiffs could not overcome the remoteness of
14
the plaintiffs' injuries in trying to establish standing.'
3.

Antitrust Injury-More Than Meets the Eye

"Antitrust injury" in the Third Circuit is defined according to the Supreme Court's definition in Brunswick.1 5 The Third Circuit has defined
antitrust injury by focusing on the language in Brunswick that states, "[Antitrust] injury flows from that which makes the defendants' act unlawful."1 16 In City of Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit interpreted the Brunswick
language to direct the court to "look back from the vantage point of the
injury . . . rather than to presume antitrust injury wherever there is an

Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 268 (denying claim for relief due, in part, to speculative
damages that "may never occur").
111. SeeJ. Truett Payne Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562
(1981) (stating that plaintiff not entitled to recovery simply by showing violation of
antitrust laws); City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 265 (stating that antitrust injury is
necessary but not sufficient to confer antitrust standing); Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1997) (same).
112. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 921 (stating that remoteness is aspect of proximate cause analysis).
113. See id. at 930 (stating that proximate cause analysis is used to "weed out"
indirect claims). It should be noted that the Third Circuit applied each factor
established in AGC to plaintiffs' claims in Steamfitters. See id. at 925-30. The Third
Circuit specifically mentioned, however, that plaintiffs' claims were the "type of
indirect claims that the proximate cause requirement is intended to weed out." Id.
at 930 (citing Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
114. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 926-30 (discussing nature and directness of
plaintiffs' injuries and concluding remoteness issue trumped all other factors).
115. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 265 (defining antitrust injury requirement (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-OMat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977))); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1163 n.9
(3d Cir. 1993) (same); Precision Surgical, Inc. v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., 111 F. Supp. 2d
586, 588 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that "concept of antitrust standing was formulated in Brunswick"); Midland Export, Ltd. v. Elkem Holding, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
163, 165 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (defining "antitrust injury" according to Supreme
Court's definition in Brunswick).
116. City of Pittsburgh, 147 F,3d at 266. In City of Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit
went on to note that another consideration is whether an agreement exists between competitors that may harm consumers in the marketplace. See id. (discussing antitrust injury requirement). The court then stated, however, that the key
sentence in Brunswick deals with whether the injury reflects the defendants' anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. See id. (quoting Brunswick, 429
U.S. at 489).
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agreement or merger that results in harm."' 17 The problem for the plaintiffs in City of Pittsburgh was that competition was not possible; therefore,
the court held that there was no antitrust injury. 118 A future plaintiff seeking to claim antitrust injury by proving lessened competition should first
make sure that competition is possible.
The antitrust injury requirement seems to overlap with causation in
some instances.' 19 Rather than trying to separate these similar concepts,
the court has, at times, opted to treat them together. 211 Because of this, it
is critical that plaintiffs plead and satisfy both factors independently, leaving no room for confusion. If one of these requirements is not met in any
given case, the Third Circuit will likely end further inquiry to determine
1
standing.12
C.

Third Circuit Requirementsfor Consumer Standing Under Section 16

Potential consumer plaintiffs under Section 16 have a lesser burden
of proof than plaintiffs seeking treble damages under Section 4.122 Nevertheless, much like constitutional standing, plaintiffs under Section 16 must
make an initial showing of entitlement.12 3 The Third Circuit has focused
on two main requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to qualify for
117. Id. at 266.
118. See id. at 266-67 (stating that because there was no competition, there was
no antitrust injury). For further discussion of the facts of City of Pittsburgh, see
supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
119. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 265-66 (grouping casual connection and
antitrust injury analysis together). The court in City of Pittsburghwent on to note
that "[a]s many commentators and courts have noted, the questions of antitrust
injury and antitrust standing are difficult to disentangle. We believe that ...there
is no bright line distinction between the two concepts." Id. at 265 n.15.
120. See id. at 265. Despite treating the two requirements as one, the court in
City of Pittsburgh rationalized its decision to deny standing based on the failure of
the plaintiffs to meet either the causation element or the antitrust injury element.
See id.
121. See, e.g., id. at 265 (determining that where antitrust injury is not present,
further inquiry is unnecessary).
122. See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 400 (3d Cir.
2000) (noting plaintiffs have fewer standing requirements under Section 16);
Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir.
1980) (stating Section 16 is more encompassing than Section 4); Mid-West Paper
Products Co. v. Cont'l Group, 596 F.2d 573, 591 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating lesser burden in Section 16 claims). The Third Circuit, in Mid-West Paperstated:
[A] claim for injunctive relief does not present the countervailing considerations-such as the risk of duplicative or ruinous recoveries and the
spectre of a trial burdened with complex and conjectural economic analyses-that the Supreme Court emphasized when limiting the availability of
treble damages.
Id. at 590.
123. Compare Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600-01 (1972) (requiring
legitimate claim to entitlement for plaintiff to establish standing under procedural
due process claim), with Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400 (requiring plaintiff class to make
showing of entitlement).
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injunctive relief: 12 4 (1) demonstration of threatened loss or injury cognizable in equity;' 25 and (2) the threatened loss must be the proximate
26
cause of the alleged injury.'
1.

Threatened Loss: Not Just Any Threat Will Do

The requirement for proof of threatened loss is a substantially lesser
burden to prove than the Section 4 requirement of actual injury.127 The
Third Circuit cases Warfarin and McCarthy v. Recordex12 1 stand for the proposition that any consumer being forced to pay inflated prices due to a
monopoly overcharge may satisfy this requirement.1 29 Another way to
124. See McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 856 (3d Cir. 1996)
(establishing requirements needed to satisfy Section 16 standing); accord Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 935
(3d Cir. 1999) (citing McCarthy, 80 F.3d at 856), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1105 (2000).
125. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400 (outlining Section 16 standing requirements); Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 935 (same); McCarthy, 80 F.3d at 856 (same).
126. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400 (discussing causation issue); Steamfitters, 171
F.3d at 926, 930 (concluding that plaintiffs' injuries were too remote from defendant's activities to satisfy causal connection requirement); City of Pittsburgh, 147
F.3d at 269 (denying plaintiff standing due to lack of causation); McCarthy, 80 F.3d
at 856 (noting Section 16 standing requirements). In City of Pittsburgh, plaintiffs
lacked antitrust injury because a regulatory scheme, not the defendant, precluded
competition. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 269 (describing rationale for decision to preclude standing).
127. See Mid-West Paper,596 F.2d at 591 (discussing difference between Section 4 and Section 16 standing requirements). In Mid-West Paper,the Third Circuit
summarized the Section 16 "threatened loss" inquiry as compared to the Section 4
actual loss requirement:
In contradistinction to § 4, § 16 does not ground injunctive relief upon a
showing that 'injury' has been already sustained, but instead makes it
available 'against threatened loss or damage....' [C] ourts have held that for
purposes of § 16 the complainant 'need only demonstrate a significant
threat of injury from an impending violation of the antitrust laws or from
a contemporary violation likely to continue or recur,' and that a person
may have standing to obtain injunctive relief even when he is denied
standing to sue for treble damages. Indeed, the test for standing under
§ 16 has been framed in terms of a proximate cause standard that is 'less
constrained' than that under § 4 ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
128. 80 F.3d 842 (3d Cir. 1996).
129. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400-01 (holding that plaintiffs that are forced to
pay inflated prices have standing under Section 16); accord McCarthy, 80 F.3d at 845
(same). The plaintiff class in Warfarin was awarded standing after alleging that
they were being forced to pay inflated prices for a prescription drug due to anticompetitive actions of drug manufacturer. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400-01.
In McCarthy, an alleged conspiracy between hospitals forced patients to pay
inflated prices for photocopies of their hospital records. See McCarthy, 80 F.3d at
845. Plaintiffs in McCarthy were clients of lawyers who were direct purchasers of
photocopies. See id. Despite the indirect purchaser status of the plaintiffs, the
Third Circuit found the plaintiffs to be sufficiently linked to the conspiracy to
satisfy Section 16 standing. See id. at 845.
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prove the threat of loss requirement is to plead that a proposed merger
130
will lessen competition and therefore cause price increases.
In City of Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit seemed to place a limit on potential plaintiffs by denying the "lessened competition" argument which
was pled to satisfy the threat of loss requirement. 131 The Third Circuit
required the plaintiffs to show both that lessened competition would cause
threat of injury, and also that alleged conspirators would have competed if
not for the merger. 13 2 Regardless of how plaintiffs go about proving the
threatened loss, they must prove that they lost, or will lose, something
13 3
identifiable.
2.

Proximate Cause

The threatened loss must also be the proximate cause of the alleged
injury. 134 In Warfarin, for example, the defendant acted to prevent competition so the price of its product could remain unreasonably high., 35 A
causal connection existed, linking the defendant's conduct-causing the
130. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1986) (addressing
whether proposed merger would satisfy threatened injury requirement); Warfarin,
214 F.3d at 400 (framing issue in question to resolve whether defendant's conduct
precluded competition and therefore led to inflated prices); City of Pittsburgh, 147
F.3d at 267 (recognizing "lessened competition" argument in merger context to
prove threat of injury requirement); see alsoJacobson & Greer, supra note 24, at
nn.71-72 (discussing implications of Cargill on plaintiffs wishing to pursue claim
based on anti-competitive activity). A proposed merger that would substantially
lessen competition is in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, but remedies are
provided under Section 4 or Section 16 of the Act. See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1992).
131. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 267 (dismissing "lessened competition"
as valid argument to satisfy threat of injury requirement).
132. See id. (stating that issue turns not on whether conspirators of monopoly
did compete "but whether they were going to compete"). In City of Pittsburghonly
one alleged conspirator had the ability to compete under the statute; therefore the
lessened competition claim failed. See id.
133. See id. at 269 (holding that threatened loss was not satisfied because
plaintiff could not prove that it lost anything). In City of Pittsburghthe Third Circuit alluded to the fact that the loss does not need to be tangible; a loss of competition will suffice. See id. (implying that proof of loss of competition would have
satisfied threat of loss requirement).
134. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400 (discussing causation issue); Steamfitters
Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 926 (3d
Cir. 1999) (concluding that plaintiffs' injuries were too remote from defendant's
activities to satisfy causal connection requirement); City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at
269 (denying plaintiff standing due to lack of causation); McCarthy, 80 F.3d at 856
(noting Section 16 standing requirements); see also AREEDA & HOvENKAMP, supra
note 8,
360 (stating that plaintiff must prove threatened loss and demonstrate
that alleged loss would be caused by alleged violation). In City of Pittsburgh,plaintiffs lacked antitrust injury because a regulatory scheme, not the defendants, precluded competition. See City of Pittsburgh,at 269 (describing rationale for decision
to preclude standing).
135. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 402 (analyzing defendant's motive for alleged
anti-competitive actions).
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136
If
high price-to the consumers who were forced to pay the high price.
any superseding cause can be linked to the injury, plaintiffs in the Third
37
Circuit will likely lose the proximate cause battle. 1

The Section 16 proximate cause analysis is just as rigorous as the Section 4 proximate cause analysis.13 8 For example, in City of Pittsburgh, the
Third Circuit denied the plaintiffs antitrust standing because of a lack of
causal connection due, in part, to the difficulty in calculating plaintiffs'
alleged damages.' 3 9 The Third Circuit has inferred that indirect purchaser status is not the main inquiry here. 140 Rather, the court focused on
whether the alleged injury is the type Congress targeted when legislating
14 1
particular conduct as unlawful under antitrust laws.
Also entangled in the proximate cause analysis is the "antitrust injury"
requirement. 42 Plaintiffs under Section 16 must prove the same "antitrust injury" as plaintiffs under Section 4.143 The Third Circuit has indi-

136. See id. (holding causation element satisfied for Section 16 injunctive relief). Contra Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 930-31 (deciding indirect nature of plaintiffs'
injuries precluded standing under Section 16). In Steamfitters, Union Health and
Welfare Funds brought a class action against defendant tobacco manufacturers to
recoup the cost of treating fund participants who suffered from smoking related
ailments. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 918-19 (discussing facts of case). Plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant manufacturers aimed to preclude the marketing of
safer tobacco products and defrauded smokers into thinking that the defendants'
products were safe. See id. Plaintiffs alleged that this action caused health complications to fund participants and cost the funds millions of dollars. See id. The
Third Circuit held that the defendants could have achieved their alleged aim without existence of the funds, therefore plaintiffs' injuries were too attenuated and
lacked causal connection to defendant. See id. at 935.
137. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 268 (holding that state regulatory
scheme severed chain of causation); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8,
363(b) (stating that plaintiffs may not be injured when statute prevents entry of
competition into market).
138. See, e.g., Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 935 (holding that because proximate
cause was not satisfied for Section 4 standing, it also was not satisfied for Section 16
standing).
139. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 268-69 (holding plaintiffs' injury claims
were "speculative" because difficult to measure).
140. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400-01 (holding direct purchaser classification
not required for relief under Section 16).
141. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 400 (deciding remoteness of injury issue based
on Congressional intent).
142. For further discussion of the "antitrust injury" requirement, see supra
note 24 and accompanying text.
143. See Warfarin, 214 F.3d at 399 (noting that "[a]n antitrust plaintiff proceeding under Section 16 must, however, still demonstrate that the injury in question is 'injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent ....
'
(quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977))); City
of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 268 (requiring Section 16 plaintiffs to prove antitrust injury as defined under Section 4 precedent). For a discussion of the antitrust injury
requirement developed in Brunswick, see supra note 24 accompanying text.
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905

plaintiffs, still requiring a "direct
cated no lessened burden on Section 16 144
effect" caused by the antitrust violation.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Consumers seeking standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act
45
should be aware that no black-letter rule establishing standing exists.'
Plaintiffs in the Third Circuit would be best advised to stress the satisfaction of every factor discussed in AGC.146 Because the AGC factors all carry
relative weight depending on the facts of the case, it is possible for plaintiffs to satisfy all but one of the factors and still be denied standing. 1 47 If a
plaintiff is fortunate enough to gain standing under Section 4, Section 16
standing will almost certainly be satisfied as well. 1 48 Section 16 plaintiffs
must otherwise prove their case much like Section 4 plaintiffs, but under a
slightly lesser burden.' 49 Specifically, Section 16 plaintiffs must establish
only a "threat" of injury, whereas Section 4 plaintiffs carry the heavier bur150
den of proving actual injury.
Michael Puleo

144. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 268 (stating that antitrust injury "must be

caused by the antitrust violation-not a mere causal link, but a direct effect" (citing Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489)).
145. See City of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 265 (quoting Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar
TractorCo., 713 F.2d 958, 964-65 (3d Cir. 1983)); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 55,
at 543 (stating that "[u] nfortunately, the courts have never been able to create an
intelligible theory of private antitrust standing .... The law remains haphazard

and inconsistent"); McShain, supra note 37, at 775 (noting "difficulty in applying
and interpreting [antitrust] standing requirements").
146. For discussion of the AGC factors, see supra notes 102-21 and accompanying text.
147. See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
171 F.3d 912, 929-31 (3d Cir. 1999) (summarizing AGC factors as applied to facts,
noting all but one factor were satisfied; however all factors were barely satisfied;
therefore they were greatly outweighed by that factor not present), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1105 (2000).
148. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 935 (citing McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80
F.3d 842, 856 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also Mosesso, supra note 21, at n.373 (describing
lessened burden for Section 16 standing requirements).
149. For further discussion of Section 16 standing requirements, see supra
notes 122-44 and accompanying text.
150. See Mosesso, supra note 21, at n.373 (stating that certain considerations
relevant in determining Section 4 standing are not relevant under Section 16 analysis). For further discussion of "threat" of injury versus "actual" injury, see supra
notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
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